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For the first time in its history, Maryland has adopted a code of evidence. The code, found in Title 5 of the 
Maryland Rules, went into effect July I, 1994. Title 5 is derived largely from the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
from the federal rules' state counterpart model, the Uniform Rules of Evidence, as well as from the pre-Title 5 
Maryland Law. 
Much of Title 5 is consistent with the prior Maryland law, even if that law was inconsistent with the federal 
rules. In some instances, however, the rules in Title 5 follow the federal or uniform rules' model instead. In others, 
Title 5 adopts an approach which was thought to borrow the best from the federal and the state models. 
One of the most controversial issues was whether to adopt the federal rules' residual hearsay exceptions, 
popularly known as the "catch-all" exceptions. In an effort not to freeze the hearsay doctrine from further 
development, ultimately the court of appeals adopted those exceptions. But the court approved a Committee Note 
with much cautionary language. The court's intention clearly was not to follow those federal courts which have 
used the hearsay catch-aIls very liberally. 
The following article, by my former student Sang Oh, presents a thoughtful analysis of Maryland 's adoption 
ofthe residual hearsay exceptions, and offers guidance to the state's courts in applying them. 
Lynn McLain, Professor 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
GARBAGE, NEAR MISSES, AND GLASS SLIPPERS: 
THE SCOPE OF ADMISSIBILITY UNDER 
MARYLAND'S RESIDUAL HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS 
SangW.Oh 
On July 1, 1994, the new Maryland Rules of Evi-
dence as provided in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules 
became applicable in all trials and hearings. 1 Although 
much of Maryland's current law of evidence will remain 
intact under Title 5, the new evidence rules will create 
a number of substantive changes. Among these changes 
are Maryland Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5), 
collectively referred to as the residual or catch-all 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.2 
Derived from Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) 
and 804(b )(5), Maryland's residual exceptions allow a 
court to admit hearsay evidence not otherwise admis-
sible if the evidence satisfies certain reliability and 
necessity standards. Part I of this article will provide a 
general background regarding the residual exceptions 
and Maryland's adoption of these hearsay exceptions. 
Part II will analyze and propose standards by which 
evidence should be introduced under these rules in a 
manner consistent with both the intent of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland and the historical treatment of 
hearsay evidence. Part III will address the constitu-
tional issues raised by the admission of hearsay under 
the residual exceptions against a criminal defendant. 
Part IV will defme and discuss the categories of residual 
hearsay. Finally, Part V will discuss and analyze 
foreseeable issues. 
I. BACKGROUND 
In general, a jurisdiction's adoption of a residual 
exception is often accompanied by ambivalent expecta-
tions ofincreased judicial activism. Whereas some view 
the residual exceptions as a positive effort to free the law 
of evidence from the "straightjacket" of the common 
law's rigorous treatment of hearsay,3 others view the 
exceptions as "a 'Trojan Horse' that has been set upon 
the judiciary to wreak havoc and to emasculate the rule 
against hearsay."4 
Despite the possibility of adverse consequences 
brought about by the residual exceptions, the court of 
appeals adopted Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5), 
evidencing its willingness to accept these risks in favor 
of what it perceived to be a greater necessity -- the need 
to infuse flexibility into the law of evidence and to aid 
its continual growth and development. 5 
The Committee Note following Mary-
Against this backdrop, courts and practitioners are 
given the task of balancing the scales and shaping the 
character of Maryland's residual exceptions. At this 
point, the practical development ofMaryland' s residual 
exceptions remains an open question, but it is not a 
question without probable answers. 
The residual exceptions are supported by almost 
nineteen years of case law from the federal courts and 
various state jurisdictions, many of which share the 
Maryland Rules Committee's intent that the residual 
exceptions be used only under exceptional circum-
stances. This fact, coupled with the no-
tion that Maryland courts have tradition-
land Rule 5-803(b )(24), however, re-
veals that the court of appeals was not 
without reservations: 
· .. courts and ally been somewhat rigorous in their ap-
proach to the hearsay rule and its excep-
tions, evidences much in predicting Mary-
land's future treatment of the residual 
exceptions. In short, the future of the 
residual exceptions may have already been 
detennined. 
The residual exceptions provided by Rule 
5-803(b)(24) and Rule 5-804(b)(5) do 
not contemplate an unfettered exercise 
of judicial discretion, but they do pro-
vide for treating new and presently unan-
ticipated situations which demonstrate a 
trustworthiness within the spirit of the 
practitioners are 
given the task of 
balancing the 
scales and shaping 
the character of 
Maryland's resid-
ual exceptions. 
II. THE SCOPE OF ADMISSmIL-
ITY 
specifically stated exceptions. Within 
this framework, room is left for growth and develop-
ment ofthe law of evidence in the hearsay area, consis-
tent with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 5-102. 
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be 
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. 
The Committee does not intend to establish a broad 
license for trial judges to admit hearsay statements that 
do not fall within one of the other exceptions contained 
in Rules 5-803 and 5-804(b). The residual exceptions 
are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the 
hearsay rule, including its present exceptions. Such 
major revisions are best accomplished by amendments 
to the Rule itself It is intended that in any case in which 
evidence is sought to be admitted under these subsec-
tions, the trial judge will exercise no less care, reflection, 
and caution than the courts did under the common law 
in establishing the now-recognized exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. 6 
Some would assert that the committee's intent is 
"taut with internal conflict."7 Along with an invitation 
to use the residual exceptions to admit reliable hearsay 
is a caveat to employ the exceptions sparingly. 8 
Admissibility under Maryland's residu-
al exceptions is conditional upon the ful-
fillment of five elements: (1) that the hearsay statement 
possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
equivalent to those exceptions provided for in 5-
803(b)(1) through (23) and 5-804(b)(I) through (4); 
(2) that the statement be offered as evidence of a 
material fact; (3) that the statement be more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; (4) that the general purposes of the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence and the interests of justice 
be best served by admission of the statement into 
evidence; and (5) that the opposing party be given 
advance notice of the intention to offer the statement 
along with the particulars of the statement. All five of 
these criteria must be met before a hearsay statement 
will be admitted pursuant to the residual exceptions. 
When a statement is admitted under either of these 
exceptions, the court should make an on-the-record 
ruling that the requirements ofthe exception have been 
satisfied.9 The appellate standard of review is ordinarily 
an abuse of discretion standard. 10 
A. Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of Trust-
worthiness 
____ . ___ . ___________________________________ . 25.1 / U. Balt. :...~. - '7/ 
The element of trustworthiness is the heart of the 
admissibility analysis under the residual exceptions. It 
is not only the most important element, but also the most 
difficult to analyze. 
Courts have employed a number of methods in 
determining the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement 
offered under the residual exceptions. One method is to 
compare the circumstances surrounding the utterance 
of the hearsay statement to underlying factors of recog-
nized hearsay exceptions. I I Although the comparison 
method is frequently employed with positive results, 
there is a significant possibility that this method could 
result in error. For this reason, the comparison method 
should not be used. 
Courts that employ the comparison method as a 
matter of course often do so either haphazardly or 
perfunctorily.12 In doing so, they demonstrate a lack of 
understanding of the nature of hearsay and why it is 
deemed inherently untrustworthy. 
The problem with hearsay evidence can best be 
understood by analyzing testimonial proof: 13 
When a witness testifies [in court] about an event, he is 
saying that he perceived a particular fact, remembered 
it up to the moment oftestifying, and is now accurately 
expressing his memory in words. Error, deliberate or 
unconscious, can enter this process anywhere between 
the initial perception and the in-court narration. For 
instance, the witness may not have perceived the event 
at all, or he may have seen it without understanding, or 
his impression may have been affected by his emotional 
and intellectual condition at the moment, or he may have 
seen it so fleetingly that no accurate impression has 
remained. Or even ifhe accurately perceived the event 
when it occurred, the passage oftime may have dulled 
his recollection or replaced the remembered facts with 
others. He may be deliberately lying in court, or be 
honestly mistaken, or be incapable of translating his 
memory into language that will have the same meaning 
to his listeners. 14 
These problems can be reduced into two salient 
questions: (1) Does the witness truly have the belief? 
and (2) Does the witness's belief genuinely reflect 
reality?15 Only ifboth questions can be answered affir-
matively will a court be justified in relying on the 
witness's statement for the truth of the matter asserted. 
These two questions can be further reduced into 
four distinct factors. 16 The first question contains the 
factors of narration/ambiguity (Do the witness's words 
accurately express what he wants to convey?) and 
sincerity (Is the witness telling the truth as he under-
stands it?).17 The second question is comprised of 
perception (Did the witness actually perceive what he 
thinks he did?) and memory (Did the witness accurately 
remember what he had perceived?). 18 
It is for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of 
any inaccuracies in these four factors that a witness is 
required to testify at trial (1) under oath, (2) personally, 
so that the trier of fact can observe the witness's 
demeanor, and (3) subject to cross-examination.19 
Hearsay evidence is ordinarily excluded because an out-
of-court statement cannot be subjected to these truth-
encouraging requirements and, consequently, the 
strengths or weaknesses of any of the four factors 
cannot be determined.20 
When hearsay is admitted pursuant to an exception, 
it is admitted because the circumstances surrounding 
the making of the statement provide sufficient answers 
to the relevant inquiries under the four factors such that 
the decalarant' s appearance at trial is unnecessary. For 
example, under the excited utterance exception to the 
hearsay rule, a hearsay statement is admissible if the 
statement relates to a startling event or condition and 
was made while the declarant was under the stress of 
excitement caused by the event or condition.21 
The pertinent questions are whether the declarant 
believed the statement to be true and whether the 
witness's belief reflected reality. Under the first prong, 
sincerity is sufficiently assured because the stress of 
excitement caused by the startling event would render 
any reflective capabilities inoperative. 22 Narration ordi-
narily would not be a problem unless the perceived 
event was comp lex or the out -of-court statement could 
be subject to differing interpretations. 
The memory factor under the second prong is 
satisfied because the requirement that the statement be 
made while under the stress of the event assures a 
relatively short passage oftime between the event and 
the utterance. 23 Arguably, the only remaining problem 
would be whether the declarant's perception was im-
paired by excitement.24 For most courts, however, the 
perception factor is not problematic. Even if perception 
in an excited state may be less trustworthy than unex-
cited perception, the overall circumstances oftrustwor-
thiness surrounding an excited utterance is not under-
= 
mined.25 Hence, despite the fact that an excited utter-
ance is a hearsay statement, it is not dependent upon an 
oath, a personal appearance by the declarant, or a cross-
examination of the declarant to assure its trustworthi-
ness. 
The key result in this analysis of the excited utter-
ance exception is that at least one factor from each 
prong is satisfied (sincerity for the first prong and 
memory in the second) and the remaining factors are not 
significantly dubious. Thus, an 
affirmative answer to the two 
available and subject to cross-examination, and the 
hearsay in question satisfies the perception, memory, 
and narration factors. 3o In essence, these courts substi-
tute the hearsay declarant's demeanor at trial to deter-
mine sincerity at the time of the out-of-court statement. 
This method may be problematic. First, admission 
of the hearsay statement may not demonstrate the 
necessity required under the residual exceptions since 
the live testimony of the declarant, especially ifunbi-
ased, is ordinarily consid-
ered to be more probative 
overriding questions concerning 
the declarant's belief can be sub-
stantiated. Scrutinizing any of 
the other currently recognized 
or firmly-rooted exceptions us-
ing this test ofthe two questions 
and its four factors (the "trust-
worthiness test") produces simi-
1ar results.26 
When hearsay is admitted 
pursuant to an exception, it is 
admitted because the circum-
evidence.3l 
Second, delayed cross-
examination examines a 
witness's story only after 
it has had an opportunity 
to solidify, making it less 
vulnerable to probing.32 
Thus, sincerity problems, 
if they exist, will not be 
fully scrutinized. Since admissibility under the 
residual exceptions requires cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness equivalenttothe firm-
ly-rooted exceptions, it follows 
stances surrounding the mak-
ing of the statement provide 
sufficient answers to the rele-
vant inquiries under the four 
factors such that the 
decalarant's appearance at trial is Consider, for example, 
an automobile collision 
case in which an eyewit-
ness utters an uncertain 
and erroneous statement 
unnecessary. 
that only hearsay statements sat-
isfying the trustworthiness test can be deemed suffi-
ciently trustworthy. 27 In practical terms, this means that 
in order for a hearsay statement to be considered 
trustworthy, at least one factor from each prong must 
be sufficiently satisfied with the remaining factors not 
seriously in doubt. 28 
The trustworthiness test, and the results that it 
produces, is preferable to the comparison method be-
cause necessary consideration is given to all of the 
pertinent questions. A court that utilizes the compari-
son method risks the chance of admitting hearsay on 
primarily one factor or what it perceives to be the 
satisfaction of numerous factors, only to have all of the 
factors pertaining to one prong. 29 In other words, these 
courts often answer only one of the pertinent inquiries 
of a proper hearsay analysis. The result is that, occa-
sionally, a hearsay statement admitted under a residual 
exception using the comparison method lacks the req-
uisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
equivalent to the firmly-rooted exceptions. 
Some courts have modified the trustworthiness test 
by admitting residual hearsay when the declarant is 
that driver A was at fault. Ascertaining problems with 
the eyewitness's sincerity may be hindered by allowing 
driver B to introduce the eyewitness's prior statement 
as residual hearsay and consequently, as substantive 
evidence, to buttress the eyewitness's in-court testimo-
ny prior to any impeachment. Because these predica-
ments may exist, the preferred course is to adopt a strict 
application of the trustworthiness questions. 
B. The Material Fact Requirement 
The requirement that a hearsay statement proffered 
under the residual exceptions be probative of a material 
fact has not proven to be significant in the residual 
exceptions analysis. In general, courts have interpreted 
this requirement as a restatement of the general require-
ment that evidence must be relevant.33 
The material fact requirement may justifiably take 
on a more significant meaning when it is interpreted as 
a requirement that the proffered hearsay statement be 
probative not only ofa "material" issue, but one that is 
also "important" to the outcome of the case.34 Courts 
are unlikely, however, to consider the argument that 
"material" means "essential," in the sense that without 
____ .--_ .• ____ . ____ .. ~-._. ___ , 25.1/ U. Bait. L.F. - SJ 
the residual hearsay the proponent's case would fail. 35 
The plain meaning of "material" is not synonymous 
with "essential. "36 
C. The Necessity Requirement 
The third clause ofthe residual exceptions provides 
that the hearsay statement be more probative on the 
point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts. Most often referred to as the necessity require-
ment,37 this clause is "intended to insure that only 
statements which have high probative value and neces-
sity may qualify for admission under the residual excep-
tions."38 
The necessity requirement has proven to be signifi-
cant in residual exceptions analysis, perhaps second in 
importance only to the trustworthiness requirement. It 
is the combination of necessity and trustworthiness 
which qualifies hearsay statements to create the excep-
tional circumstances that justify its admission under the 
residual exceptions.39 
The necessity requirement precludes the admission 
of hearsay evidence if there is reasonably obtainable 
evidence more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than the hearsay statement and the proponent 
fails to procure that evidence for trial. 40 Residual 
hearsay should also be excluded if other evidence, 
which is more probative on the point for which the 
hearsay is offered, has already been admitted and the 
hearsay at issue possesses minimal probative value in 
light of the other evidence.41 In that case, the hearsay 
should be excluded on the grounds that it would essen-
tially amount to cumulative evidence.42 
On balance, a proponent will satisfy the necessity 
requirement by showing that reasonable and diligent 
efforts could not have obtained evidence which is more 
probative than the proffered hearsay or that more 
probative evidence could not have been procured be-
cause of an unreasonable burden.43 Hence, it is impor-
tant that the court take into account the resources of the 
proponent and what is at stake in the litigation. "What 
amounts to 'reasonable efforts' by a corporate litigant 
in an enormous treble damage action is not the same as 
the 'reasonable efforts' which may be expected of an 
indigent defendant in a criminal prosecution. "44 
One last issue raised by the necessity requirement 
under Rule 5-803(b )(24) is whether the live testimony 
of an available witness, if reasonably obtainable, will 
always constitute evidence more probative on the point 
-] 
for which it is offered than a hearsay statement.45 Most 
courts would hold that for the purposes of Rule 5-
803(b)(24), the live testimony of an available witness 
would possess more probative value in establishing the 
truth than a bare hearsay statement since the jury would 
be able to observe the witness's demeanor and the 
witness's testimony would be subjectto cross-examina-
tion.46 However, if circumstances such as time, dura-
tion, or mental infirmity prevent a witness from render-
ing full and adequate testimony, the most probative 
evidence may well be the proffered hearsay Y 
D. The Interests of Justice Requirement 
The interests ofj ustice requirement is a restatement 
oftheprinciplescontainedinMd. Rule 5-102.48 Rule 5-
102 provides that the rules "shall be construed to secure 
fairness in administration, eliminate unjustifiable ex-
pense and delay, and promote the growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may 
be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." 
Undoubtedly, these are desirable goals, but it is precari-
ous to utilize such words as a pragmatic touchstone for 
guidance in resolving specific issues. 
The danger arises when courts interpret the inter-
ests of justice requirement as a discretionary power to 
decide issues based upon personal notions of justice. 
This interpretation is partially correct; courts do and 
should exclude hearsay evidence on the basis that 
admission does not serve the interests of justice. How-
ever, hearsay evidence should never be admitted under 
the residual exceptions solely upon this basis.49 
The interests of justice requirement is but one 
criterion of admissibility under the residual exceptions. 
Admitting evidence solely on this basis would disregard 
the importance of the four other requirements. Courts 
have also made the mistake of interpreting the interests 
of justice requirement so as to blur the requirement with 
the necessity or trustworthiness requirement. 50 
E. Notice Requirement 
The last requirement of the residual exceptions 
mandates that the proponent of the hearsay evidence 
provide the opponent with notice of the intent to offer 
the evidence "sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the [opponent] with a fair opportu-
nity to prepare to meet it." Facially, the clause appears 
inflexible, suggesting that if notice is not provided to the 
opponent prior to trial, hearsay evidence is barred under 
the residual exceptions. 
Although some courts have enforced this provision 
strictly,51 most courts have adopted a flexible approach 
if the need for the hearsay statement arises shortly 
before or during the trial, provided that a continuance 
affords the opponent an adequate opportunity to pre-
pare.52 Some courts have dispensed with the notice 
requirement if the opponent either possessed the re-
sidual hearsay evidence for inspection prior to trial or 
failed to assert the need for a continuance. 53 Virtually 
all courts, however, hold that after a certain point in the 
trial process evidence cannot be admitted under the 
residual exceptions if notice has not been given to the 
opponent. 54 
Of these three approaches, the flexible approach is 
the most preferable. 55 Given the uncertain nature ofthe 
trial process, there will be occasions when even the most 
conscientious litigator will be faced with situations of 
genuine surprise. 56 In such a situation, the notice 
requirement should be interpreted to require that the 
court provide the opponent with a continuance suffi-
cient to prepare to meet the 
belated proffer. 57 But courts 
the defendant and her co-defendants as the child's 
abusers. 
Citing Ohio v. Roberts,62 the Court held that in order 
to satisfY the Confrontation Clause, the proponent of 
incriminating hearsay not falling within a firmly-rooted 
hearsay exception63 has the burden of proving that the 
statement possesses "particularized guarantees oftrust-
worthiness."64 To determine the existence of these 
particularized guarantees, a court must look at "the 
totality of circumstances that surround the making of 
the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy ofbelief ... [such that] adversarial testing would 
add little to [the statement's] reliability."6 
The Wright Court held, however, that the existence 
of corroborating evidence could not be considered in 
evaluating the totality of circumstances. To hold o~h­
erwise would be to "permit admission of a presump-
tively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the 
trustworthiness of other evidence at trial."66 This result 
would be at "odds with the 
requirement that hearsay evi-
dence admitted under the should require the proponent to 
show the inability to have pre-
dicted the need to offer the hear-
say in question under the resid-
ual exceptions in advance of 
trial. 58 The flexible approach 
satisfies the purpose of the no-
tice requirement, which is to 
provide adequate time for the 
opponent to prepare, 59 and plac-
es the opponent in no worse a 
... a court must look at 
"the totality of circum-
stances that surround the 
making of the statement 
and that render the 
Confrontation Clause be so 
trustworthy that cross-exam-
ination ofthe declarant would 
be of marginal utility."67 
Wright applies to the ad-
mission ofincriminating hear-
say evidence against a crim-
inal defendant under Rule 5-
804(b)(5). The court must 
declarant particularly 
worthy of belief . .. " 
position than he would have 
faced had pretrial notice been given. 60 
m. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATING TO 
CATCH-ALL HEARSAY 
A. The Right of Confrontation 
When a hearsay statement is to be admitted against 
a criminal defendant and the declarant is unavailable to 
testifY at trial, there may be another consideration to 
admitting hearsay even after a court has made the 
determination that the statement satisfies the five re-
quirements under the residual exceptions. 
In Idaho v. Wright,61 the United States Supreme 
Court considered whether the right of confrontation 
precludes a court from admitting as residual hearsay 
testimony from an unavailable child witness identifYing 
consider and satisfY the re-
quirements of the Confron-
tation Clause by finding particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness without regard to corroborative evi-
dence. 
The Wright decision should not be an additional 
concern in 5-804(b)(5) analysis if the trustworthiness 
analysis as advocated above in section IlIA. is fol-
lowed. The trustworthiness test incorporates the con-
siderations and rationale as mandated by the decision in 
Wright. 68 
B. Due Process Considerations 
Unlike the Confrontation Clause, which may oper-
ate to heighten the standard of admissibility under Rule 
5-804(b)( 5), the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment may serve to abate rigid adherence to one 
or more of the five requirements of the residual excep-
_25.1/0. Ball. :....? - ~ ~ 
tions. 
In Foster v. State,69 the trial court rejected the 
defendant's proffer of an out-of-court statement in 
which a murder victim told a friend that she had been 
threatened by the defendant's husband. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that the proffered testimony 
was critical to the defense's theory thatthe defendant's 
husband had committed the murder. The exclusion of 
the statement, on hearsay grounds, was held to have 
violated the defendant's due process rights because it 
deprived the defendant of a fair trial. 70 The court opined 
that the statement bore persuasive assurances of trust-
worthiness which would favor admissibility.71 The 
defendant's husband's threat was both spontaneous and 
a statement against interest. The victim's statement was 
also made spontaneously, in an excited state, and under 
circumstances in which she had no reason to lie. There 
was also evidence to corroborate the truth of the 
statement as well as the presence of the accused's 
husband for cross-examination. 72 
The Foster decision stands for the principle that if 
a criminal defendant offers trustworthy hearsay evi-
dence which is critical to a defense, such that exclusion 
ofthat evidence would amount to a denial of a fair trial, 
exclusion ofthat evidence may constitute a denial of due 
process.73 Applying Foster to a criminal defendant's 
offer of hearsay evidence under the residual exceptions, 
if the hearsay statement is trustworthy and critical to the 
defense but fails to comply with, for example, the notice 
requirement, due process may demand that a flexible 
approach be employed to facilitate admission of the 
hearsay.74 
IV. THE THREE CATEGORIES OF RESIDUAL 
HEARSAY 
Evidence sought to be admitted under the residual 
exceptions can be delineated into three categories. In 
ascending order oflegitimacy, they will be referred to as 
"garbage," "near misses," and "glass slippers." 
A. Garbage 
"Garbage" is evidence which should not be admit-
ted under the residual exceptions because it fails one or 
more of the five required elements. Most significantly 
and most often, garbage hearsay will not possess equiva-
lent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. 75 
B. Near Misses 
In Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Elec-
tric Industrial Company, Ltd., 76 an opponent of hearsay 
evidence asserted that the residual hearsay exceptions 
could not be invoked to admit hearsay evidence if that 
evidence is generally of a type covered by another 
specific hearsay exception, but fails to meet the precise 
requirements of that specific exception. The issue 
raised by this contention has come to be known as the 
"near miss" problem. 
Courts differ widely in their analysis of this issue. 
Some courts hold that the failure of hearsay evidence to 
qualify under the more particular exception is proof of 
the insufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness.77 Other courts routinely admit near misses and 
even consider a near miss characteristic to be a positive 
factor, weighing in favor of admission under the re-
sidual exceptions. 78 
In Zenith Radio Corporation, Judge Becker 
authored an opinion for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania present-
ing a novel middle-ground approach which has periodi-
cally received favorable reviews.79 The court held that 
the residual exceptions should not be used to admit 
hearsay evidence when the evidence is more appropri-
ately subject to scrutiny under another specific excep-
tion covering a clearly defined category of hearsay 
evidence.8o The court reasoned, however, that most of 
the hearsay exceptions did not delineate a clearly de-
fined category but, rather, applied to a relatively "amor-
phous category of evidence."81 For near misses under 
these amorphous exceptions, the court opined that the 
residual exceptions could be invoked.82 To proscribe 
the use of the residual exceptions for this type ofhearsay 
evidence would be to "negat[ e] the residual exceptions 
altogether."83 
The Zenith Radio Corporation decision was re-
versed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit.84 Holding that all types of hearsay 
evidence may rightfully be considered under the re-
sidual exceptions even after failing admissibility stan-
dards under another applicable exception, the court 
criticized Judge Becker's theory on the grounds that it 
had no precedential support and would place the federal 
rules of evidence back into the "straightjacket" from 
which the residual exceptions were intended to be 
freed. 85 
The Maryland courts' position in the near miss 
debate is unknown at this point. In promulgating the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence, the Rules Committee did 
not explicitly state whether "near misses" would be 
admitted under the residual exceptions. Given the 
choice of regarding a near miss characteristic of hearsay 
evidence as either a positive or negative factor, the 
Maryland courts would probably hold that a near miss 
is a negative factor in the admissibility analysis. A 
decision that a near miss is a positive factor would be a 
deviation from Maryland's traditionally stricttreatment 
of hearsay exceptions. 
Treatment of the near miss problem is not, however, 
reduced merely to this positive or negative determina-
tion. A prudent alternative approach to the near miss 
problem is to ignore it completely. The fact that hearsay 
evidence is a near miss should be construed to be neither 
a positive nor negative factor-- it simply is not relevant. 
As outlined above, the admissibility 
of hearsay evidence under the residual 
article published fifty years earlier which described a fire 
in the courthouse while it was under construction. The 
court found that the article did not fit within any 
recognized hearsay exception but admitted the evi-
dence on the basis that it was necessary, more probative 
than any other evidence available, and contained suffi-
cient circumstantial guarantees oftrustworthiness. 91 
Dallas County is an exceptional case presenting 
unanticipated circumstances. It was in anticipation of 
such glass slipper cases that the residual exceptions 
were devised.92 
There is dispute, however, as to whether residual 
hearsay must rise to the level of being "Dallas County-
exceptional or unanticipated" to be admissible. In other 
words, in addition to satisfying the 
exceptions is conditional upon the care-
ful scrutiny and satisfaction of five re-
quirements. This analysis should be done 
without regard to whether the evidence 
is a near miss. 86 
This may mean that certain near 
misses would be admitted under the 
residual exceptions while othernearmiss-
es may be excluded. 87 This is all, howev-
er, beside the point. If the hearsay 
possesses equivalent circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness based upon 
satisfaction ofthe trustworthiness test as 
A "glass slipper" is 
... a hearsay state-
ment that exhibits a 
perfect fit under the 
residual exceptions. 
.. Glass slippers are 
five expressed requirements con-
tained in the residual exceptions, 
must residual hearsay also relate to 
a previously unaddressed subject? 
There are valid arguments on 
both sides of the issue. The re-
quirement that residual hearsay be 
"exceptional" is not an expressed 
requirement ofthe residual excep-
tions and it may be an ambiguous 
criterion.93 
the only evidence 
that should be ad-
milted under the On balance, there is validity to the 
residual exceptions. "exceptional" requirement. If the 
proffered hearsay relates to but 
fails the criteria of a specific and 
clearly defined hearsay exception, 
advocated in section II.A. above, its 
status as a near miss should not deprive 
that evidence of its rightful admissibility. 88 
c. Glass Slippers 
A "glass slipper" is the name the author has given 
to a hearsay statement that exhibits a perfect fit under 
the residual exceptions by satisfying all five require-
ments. Glass slippers are the only evidence that should 
be admitted under the residual exceptions.89 
The case most frequently cited in relation to the 
residual exceptions is the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' decision in Dallas Countyv. Commercial Union 
Assurance Company.90 In Dallas County, the plaintiff 
attempted to seek remuneration from an insurer for a 
collapsed courthouse tower, claiming that it was struck 
by lightning. The insurer attempted to avoid the plaintiff's 
claim by asserting that the tower collapsed as a result of 
a structural weakness. As proof of the structural 
weakness, the insurer offered a copy of a newspaper 
admitting the near miss hearsay under the residual 
exceptions would undermine the purpose ofthe specific 
exception.94 
However, the "exceptional" rationale could also 
serve to exclude near miss hearsay relating to the 
relatively amorphous exceptions since those exceptions 
do anticipate specific subject areas. This result, besides 
being contrary to the majority of courts' decisions, may 
have the effect of excluding otherwise trustworthy and 
necessary hearsay. 95 
Whether the Maryland courts will impose the "ex-
ceptional" or "unanticipated" requirement as part of 
Rules 5-803(b )(24) and 5-804(b )(5) is unknown. How-
ever, incorporating this requirement in some manner 
would be consistent with the rigorous approach en-
dorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Heyward. 96 
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V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FORE-
SEEABLE ISSUES 
A. Grand Jury Testimony 
Federal Rule 804(b )(5) has served as the avenue by 
which courts have allowed the introduction of grand 
jury testimony from unavailable witnesses. Accord-
ingly, this issue is likely to arise under Mary land Rule 5-
804(b)(5). 
Arguably, grand jury testimony of an unavailable 
witness should never be admitted as residual hearsay. It 
is, in essence, a type of former testimony which should 
be governed by Rule 5-804(b)(1).97 But grand jury 
testimony is a near miss under Rule 5-804(b )( 1 ) because 
the party against whom the testimony is ordinarily 
offered did not have the opportunity to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
As a near miss under an arguably specific and clearly 
defined hearsay exception, grand jury testimony should 
not be admissible under the residual exceptions.98 Ad-
mitting such evidence would have the effect of altering 
and expanding the types of former testimony that are 
permissible under Rule 5-804(b)(1), a result that the 
residual exceptions are arguably not meant to accom-
plish. 
This argument is persuasive. But it is not supported 
by the decisions of the courts which have considered the 
Issue. 
The federal circuits are currently divided regarding 
two concerns which are present in the context of 
admitting grand jury testimony against a criminal defen-
dant as residual hearsay. The first concern is whether 
such evidence violates the rule against hearsay, or 
whether it can satisfy all of the requirements of the 
residual exceptions. The second issue is whether the 
admission of an unavailable witness's grand jury testi-
mony violates the Confrontation Clause. 
Some courts routinely allow the admission of grand 
jury testimony against a criminal defendant reasoning 
that neither the rule against hearsay nor the Confronta-
tion Clause will be violated as long as surrounding 
circumstances and evidence corroborating the testi-
mony provide a sufficient indicia of reliability. 99 
These decisions are not well reasoned. They erro-
neously merge the hearsay and Confrontation Clause 
analysis, deciding cases without any detailed distinction 
between the two principles. 100 Moreover, these result-
oriented decisions often admit grand jury testimony 
evidencing only superficial guarantees oftrustworthi-
ness. tOt Lastly, these courts often determine the trust-
worthiness of the grand jury testimony by impermissibly 
"bootstrapping" on the existence of corroborating 
evidence. 102 
Other courts have taken a more restrictive approach 
to the admission of grand jury testimony as residual 
hearsay. These courts have clearly recognized and 
given effect to the distinction between the hearsay rule 
and the Confrontation Clause and conducted two sepa-
rate inquiries. 103 Using this approach, courts will allow 
the admission of grand jury testimony only when the 
substance ofthe grandjury testimony satisfies both the 
requirements of the residual exceptions and the safe-
guards of the Confrontation Clause. In most of these 
cases, however, courts have allowed the admission of 
grand jury testimony from an unavailable witness under 
the particular facts because the opposing party was 
viewed to have "waived" the right to object under the 
Confrontation Clause. t04 Under this so-called "waiver 
theory ," if a party, by its conduct, causes the unavail-
ability of the declarant of the grand jury testimony, the 
party waives Confrontation Clause objections and, a 
fortiori, any hearsay objections because "[t]he law 
simply cannot countenance a defendant deriving ben-
efits from murdering [or otherwise incapacitating] the 
chief witness against him."105 
The waiver theory seems to present an acceptable 
median between routine admissions and strict exclu-
sions of grand jury testimony in all cases. 106 Arguably, 
hindering a witness's testimony presents an exceptional 
situation warranting application of the residual excep-
tions. 
Even if Maryland courts opt to take a restrictive 
approach to grand jury testimony, it may not serve the 
ends of justice or promote the growth and flexibility of 
the law of evidence to exclude grand jury testimony in 
such egregious circumstances. 
B. Children's Statements 
In recent years, the most prolific use of the residual 
exceptions has been in child abuse prosecutions where 
the child victim has been unable to testify at trial due to 
emotional distress or incompetence. In these cases, 
courts have routinely admitted the child victim's out -of-
court statements to third parties as residual hearsay. 107 
In Maryland, courts traditionally have been reluc-
tant, at best, to admit this type of hearsay .108 As of July 
1, 1994, however, this restrictive tradition may be 
subject to change. 
With the adoption of the residual exceptions, Mary-
land courts will no longer be able to exclude child abuse 
victim's statements merely because the statements do 
not fall under a recognized exception.109 Instead, they 
will be forced to conduct a residual exceptions analysis 
to determine the trustworthiness and need for the child 
hearsay statements. 
Whether the Maryland courts will follow the broad 
majority of jurisdictions and admit child hearsay under 
the residual exceptions is unknown. However, resis-
tance to admit this type of evidence, if any, will be 
further undermined by §9-103.l of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article of the Mary land Annotated 
Code (out of court statements of 
child abuse victims) and its 1994 
amendments. 
rule, is for the ascertainment of the truth. As long as 
Maryland Rules 5 -803 (b )(24) and 5 -804(b)( 5) contrib-
ute to this goal, they are valuable and worthwhile. 
There is no way to determine in advance if the 
residual exceptions will actually serve their purpose and 
contribute to the judicial process in Maryland. In 
essence, it is an experiment. 
Some are likely to disagree with this uncertain 
outlook. They would like to believe that the Maryland 
residual exceptions will be scrupulously limited with 
virtually no deviation from the common law. This, 
however, is unlikely to prove true. 
This article has attempted to show in many respects 
that the interpretation of the residual exceptions is not 
an exact science; there are nu-
merous issues subject to de-
bate. 
Enacted in 1988, § 9-103.1 is 
a statutory hearsay exception 
which provides for the admis-
sion of an unavailable child 
victim's out-of-court statement 
to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted if 1) the child is under 
the age of 12 years; 2) the state-
ment is not admissible under any 
other hearsay exception; 3) the 
Each year the residual 
exceptions generate ap-
proximately fifty or more 
reported decisions. More 
than likely, Maryland 
Each year the residual 
exceptions generate approxi-
mately fifty or more reported 
decisions. More than likely, 
Maryland courts will contribute 
to these numbers. 
courts will contribute to However, the active in-
tegration of the residual excep-
tions into Maryland law should 
not be construed as the demise 
of the hearsay rule. Instead, a 
consistent and sound interpre-
these numbers. 
statement possesses "particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness"; 4) the statement is made to a licensed physician, 
psychologist, social worker, or teacher acting in the 
course of the individual's profession at the time of the 
statement; 5) there is corroborating evidence; and 6) 
notice is provided to the opponent at least twenty days 
before the statement is adduced. 
During Maryland's 1994 legislative session, the 
statute was amended to allow for the admission of a 
child victim's hearsay statement regardless of whether 
thechildisavailablefortrial. The adoption of the newly-
amended §9-1 03.1, along with the residual exceptions, 
bodes in favor of the proponents of child hearsay 
evidence. The two provisions will potentially function 
as powerful, alternative vehicles promoting the admis-
sion of child hearsay. 1 \0 
CONCLUSION 
Most would agree that the primary purpose of the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions, like any other evidentiary 
tation ofthe residual exceptions in conformity with the 
principles underlying the hearsay rule will result in a 
body of evidentiary law securing flexibility and fairness 
for the future. 
ENDNOTES 
1 Title 5 of the Maryland Rules will not, however, be 
applicable (1) in any trial or hearing commenced prior 
to July 1, 1994, or (2) to admit evidence against a 
defendant in a criminal action whose crime was alleg-
edly committed prior to July 1, 1994, unless such 
evidence would have been admissible under the law and 
Rules in effect on June 30, 1994. 
2 5-803(b)(24) provides: "Under exceptional circum-
stances, the following are not excluded by the hearsay 
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: 
A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circum-
_____ . _________________ ______ 25.11 U. Bait. L=. - ~ © 
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court de-
termines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of 
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on 
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and 
the interests of justice will be best served by admission 
ofthe statement into evidence. A statement may not be 
admitted under this exception unless the proponent of 
it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, 
including the name and address of the declarant." 
5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5) differ only in that the 
latter requires a showing of the declarant's unavailabil-
ity whereas the former is applicable without regard to 
the issue of availability. Most courts refer to the two 
sections interchangeably and analyze them without 
differences in application. E.g., United States v. Kim, 
595 F.2d. 755, 765 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also 
Emerging Problems Under The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence (David A. Schlueter ed., 2d ed. 1991). 
3 E.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 
F.2d 238,302 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds 
sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
4 E.g., James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Excep-
tion Reconsidered, 20 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 787, 794 
(1993). 
5 Proponents of Rules 5-803(b)(24) and 5-804(b)(5) 
suggested to the Rules Committee that without these 
provisions, the law of hearsay and its exceptions would 
become detrimentally "frozen." It was explained that 
the now-existing exceptions to the hearsay rule were 
not conceived overnight but were rather formulated 
over hundreds of years of judicial experience. To 
suppose that all reliable and necessary exceptions to the 
hearsay rule have been determined and recognized by 
the courts would not only be presumptuous but errone-
ous. In the absence of the residual exceptions, Mary-
land courts would not have the vehicle to effectively 
deal with probable future cases which would present 
reliable and necessary hearsay evidence not specifically 
covered under the currently recognized exceptions. 
Interview with Lynn McClain, University of Baltimore 
Professor of Law and Special Reporter to the Court of 
Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, in Baltimore, Maryland (March 4, 1994). 
When Colorado initially adopted an evidence code 
modeled after the federal rules, it did not include the 
residual exceptions. However, after the case ofW CL. 
v. People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984), the Colorado 
Rules of Evidence were amended. In reluctantly revers-
ing a lower court's admission of a child's trustworthy 
hearsay statement identifying her abuser, the Supreme 
Court of Colorado opined that the facts in the case 
demonstrated the wisdom of including in the Colorado 
Rules of Evidence a residual hearsay exception such as 
that in Federal Rule 803(24). Id. at 178-82. 
6 Md. Rule 5-803(b )(24) Committee Note derived from 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Advisory Committee's Note and 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report. 
7 4 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, 
Federal Evidence § 472, at 923 (1980). 
8Id. 
9 "In order to establish a well-defined jurisprudence, the 
special facts and circumstances which, in the court's 
judgment, indicates [sic] that the statement has a suffi-
ciently high degree of trustworthiness and necessity to 
justify its admission should be stated on the record." 
Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report; See also Huffv. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 
286,291-92 (7th Cir. 1979) (reviewing the trial court's 
ruling of rej ecting the offering of a statement under the 
residual exception, the court noted that in reviewing 
discretionary findings it is "greatly aided when the 
record contains a statement of the reasons for the ruling 
and any findings made .... "). 
\0 E.g., United States v. Bachsian, 4 F.3d 796, 797 (9th 
Cir. 1993); State v. Davi, 504 N.W.2d 844,853 (S.D. 
1993); Hallv. State,611 So.2d915, 917 (Miss. 1992); 
State v. Barger, 810 P.2d 191, 193 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1990). For appellate review of residual hearsay on 
constitutional grounds, however, the standard of re-
viewis de novo. But see Lynn McLain, Maryland Rules 
of Evidence § 2.803.1 (11) (West 1994) (One court of 
appeals judge expressed an opinion that the standard for 
reviewing a trial court's decision on any residual hear-
say should not be an abuse of discretion standard. 
Instead, the judge feltthat by allowing residual hearsay, 
the trial court would, in effect, be creating a new hearsay 
exception applicable to the case before it. An error in 
this capacity would not only amount to an error as an 
evidentiary ruling but also on a matter of law. The 
judge, therefore, opined that de novo review should 
apply to all evidence admitted under the residual excep-
tions.). See also Myrna S. Raeder, The Hearsay Rule 
at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto By Judicial 
Discretion? 76 Minn. L. Rev. 507,517 (1992) ("[T]he 
appellate decisions [concerning the residual excep-
tions] are not offering an effective stopgap, in part, 
because they review an admission of such hearsay for 
abuse of discretion and harmless error ... [which has] 
infected the review of evidentiary issues concerning 
questions oflaw which should be determined de novo. "). 
II See e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F .2d 1321, 
1350 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that entries in a desk 
calendar appointment diary kept by a government wit-
ness were within Federal Rule 804(24) because "[a] 
number offactors combine to demonstrate the reliabil-
ity of the entries: the highly self-incriminatory nature of 
the entries themselves, the regularity with which they 
were made, [and the witness's] need to rely on the 
entries. Where evidence complies with the spirit, if not 
the l[ e ]tter of several exceptions, admissibility is appro-
priate under the residual exception."); See also United 
States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976, 981 (1Ith Cir.) 
(court compared grand jury testimony to the other four 
exceptions under 804(b)) cert. dismissed, 495 U.S. 944 
(1989). 
12 See id 
134 Jack B. Weinstein& Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's 
Evidence ~ 800[01] at 800-9 to 800-10 (1984). 
14Id 
15 Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. 
L. Rev. 957, 959 (1974). 
16 See Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the 




19 Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence 
§ 801.1, at 682 (2d ed. 1986). 
20 Id at 682-83. 
21 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2). 
22 Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692,697,452 A.2d 661, 
664 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Nance v. 
State, 331 Md. 549,569,629 A.2d 633, 643 (1993). 
23 See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,21,536 A.2d 
666, 676 (1988). 
24 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 803(2).1 (1987). 
25 Hensley v. Rich, 38 Md. App. 334, 341, 380 A.2d 252, 
255 (1977). 
26 Note that the trustworthiness test is only relevant to 
the admissibility of hearsay statements. That is, only 
out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted need satisfy this test. For example, an 
out-of-court statement offered as circumstantial evi-
dence of the declarant's state of mind only answers the 
question of whether the declarant had the belief. How-
ever, because the statement is not offered to prove the 
truth, whether the statement reflects reality is irrelevant. 
The statement is admitted as non-hearsay. 
27 In an effort to determine the trustworthiness of a 
hearsay statement, some courts have examined whether 
other extrinsic evidence in the case corroborates the 
truthfulness ofthe hearsay statement. E.g., United 
States v. Guinan, 836 F.2d350, 356-57 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied,487U.S.1218 (1988); UnitedStatesv. Barlow, 
693 F.2d 954,962 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 
(1982). 
The corroboration factor, however, would seem to 
be inappropriate in light ofthe Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23 (1990), 
in which the Court opined that the analysis of a hearsay 
statement should be restricted to the circumstances 
surrounding the making ofthe statement without con-
sideration of corroborative facts establishing the accu-
racy of the statement. See infra part IlI.A. 
28 As a model in accordance with the trustworthiness 
test, the author proposes that a court should, at a 
minimum, ask the following questions to ascertain the 
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement: 
Does the Declarant Have the BelieF 
Narration/Ambiguity: 
1) Is the statement subject to differing interpre-
tations? 
2) Is the event which the declarant spoke of so 
complex that mere words may not be able to accurately 
convey the nature of the event? 
Sincerity: 
1) Would the declarant have a motive to fabri-
cate? 
2) Was the statement a result ofleading ques-
tions or any other type of suggestiveness? 
Does the Declarant's Belief Reflect Reality? 
Perception: 
1) Did the declarant have a first-hand percep-
tion ofthe event being described? 
2) Could the declarant have been honestly mis-
taken? 
-------------------- ,<_ •• _---_.--- _ •. -.- .,', 
.. , __ 25.1/ U. Bait. L.:-. - ~'jJ 
Memory: 
1) Did the declarant have time for reflective 
thought between the event and the statement such that 
he or she could have been influenced by emotions or 
intellect? 
2) Was the method of preserving the informa-
tion contained in the statement subject to error? 
29 E.g., United States v. Irish People, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 
114, 120 (D.D.C. 1984) (letters obtained in search of 
defendant's files held to be admissible under Federal 
Rule 803(24) because the letters possessed an aura of 
credibility similar to that of business records since they 
were "intemalletters" produced in the business setting 
and the authors had no reason to falsify its contents; no 
consideration given to memory factor), rev 'd on other 
grounds, 796 F.2d 520 (l986). 
30 See e.g., United States v. Leslie, 542 F.2d 285 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (upholding the admission of inconsistent 
hearsay statements as substantive evidence under Fed-
eral Rule 803(24) because although the hearsay state-
ments were not given under oath or in another proceed-
ing, indicia of reliability was present in light of the fact 
that statements had been made shortly after the events 
occurred and the declarants were available to be cross-
examined as to their sincerity); Grimes v. Employers 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. a/Wis., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 
1977) ("There are no problems with perception, memory 
or meaning, and any sincerity problems can be solved by 
having the verifying witness and the plaintiff-actor 
subj ect to cross-examination. "). 
31 See infra note 45 and accompanying text. 
32 Tribe, supra note 15, at 962. 
33 E.g., Huffv. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286,294 
(7th Cir. 1979). See also McCormick on Evidence § 
324, at 366 (4th ed. 1992). 
34 Cf United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559 
(E.D.N. Y), ("This [materiality] requirement seems re-
dundant since, if it did not tend to prove or disprove a 
material fact, the evidence would not be relevant and 
would not be admissible under Rules 401 and 402. 
What is probably meant is that the [residual] exception 
should not be used for trivial or collateral matters.") 
aff'd, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1041 (1977); Graham, supra, note 19 § 803.24, at 
925 ("The requirement that the statement be offered as 
evidence of a material fact probably means that not only 
must the fact the statement is offered to prove be 
relevant, Rule 401, but that the fact to be proved be of 
substantial importance in determining the outcome of 
the litigation."). 
35 United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-89 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (l982). 
36 See id. 
37 See e.g., United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294,299 
(5th Cir. 1977) (characterizing this requirement as a 
"built-in requirement of necessity."). 
38 Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Committee 
Report. 
39 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee Report ("The committee believes that there are 
certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which 
is found by a court to have guarantees reflected by the 
presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of 
prolativeness [sic] and necessity could properly be 
admissible."). 
40 See e.g., Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630 
(9th Cir. 1991) (court held reversible error to admit 
quotations from three independent newspapers because 
the newspaper reporters would have provided better 
evidence of the statements and would have been subj ect 
to cross-examination); Noble v. Alabama Dept. 0/ 
Envtl. Mgmt., 872 F.2d 361, 366 (l1th Cir. 1989) 
(admission ofletters was improper where proponent of 
evidence made no showing that reasonable efforts could 
not have produced the writers). 
41 E.g., Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 
319,325 (lOth Cir. 1989) (excluding two published 
reports as hearsay not satisfying Federal Rule 803(24) 
because much of the information contained in the 
reports was otherwise admitted through the testimony 
of various experts). Contra Louisell et aI., supra note 
7, §472, at 936 (1980) ("Amore constructive reading 
[ofthe necessity requirement] requires the proponent of 
a statement under the [residual] exception to introduce 
all evidence within his reasonable reach which is 'more 
probative' on the point in question than the statement. 
.. first. [T]his reading implies that a diligent party may 
resort to the [residual] exception even though 'more 
probative' evidence has already been received on the 
point in question. And this reading is the preferable one: 
It serves adequately the congressional purpose of pre-
venting unnecessary resort to the [residual] exception 
while stopping short of excluding automatically those 
statements which are trustworthy and relevant on points 
which remain sufficiently in doubt to be resolvable 
either way by the trier of fact."). 
= 
42 Md. Rule 5-403 ("Although relevant, evidence may 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by ... needless cumulative evidence."). Cj 
Weinstein et aI., supra note 11, ~ 803(24)[01] at 803-
379 ("Even though the evidence may be somewhat 
cumulative, it may be important in evaluating other 
evidence and arriving at the truth so that the 'more 
probative' requirement can not [ sic] be interpreted with 
cast iron rigidity."). 
The author would concur with the view of admitting 
hearsay evidence under the residual exception for such 
limited instances in which the probative value of the 
residual hearsay is clearly not minimal. Cf United 
States v. Hing Shair Chan, 680 F. Supp. 521, 526 
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (admitting hearsay evidence to boost 
the credibility of a co-conspirator in the government's 
case-in-chief). Cf Hing Shair Chan with United States 
v. Belfany, 965 F.2d 575 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding as 
harmless error the admission ofa child's hearsay state-
ment which was not more probative than other exten-
sively available evidence). 
The Belfany court's view of holding as harmless 
error the admission of cumulative hearsay under the 
residual exception if other more probative evidence 
could have sustained the verdict is widely shared. 
Quaere: Doesn't this rationale have the effect ofnulli-
fYing the necessity requirement? Wouldn't the extraor-
dinary purpose of the residual exceptions be better 
served by adopting a stricter approach in which the 
erroneous admission of evidence under the exception be 
viewed as more than harmless error? See generally 
deMarsv. Equitable Life Assurance Soc yo/the United 
States, 610 F.2d 55, 61 (1st Cir. 1979) ("The require-
ments of [the necessity requirement] of the rule cannot 
be ignored. "). 
43 E.g., UnitedStatesv. Simmons, 773 F.2d 1455, 1459 
(4th Cir. 1985) (necessity requirement met where the 
alternative to the admission of Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tabacco, and Firearms trace forms was to require the 
government to bring custodians of the manufacturer's 
records from across the country to testifY to the simple 
fact that certain weapons were moved in interstate 
commerce); United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 
119 (9th Cir. 1979) (court allowed the admission of 
Chilean travel documents because the government could 
not obtain any other equivalent evidence). See also 
Weinstein et aI., supra note 13, ~ 803(24)[01], at 803-
379 (1984) ("It should not be necessary to scale the 
highest mountains of Tibet to obtain a deposition for use 
in a $500 damage claim arising from an accident with a 
postal truck. "). 
44 Louisell et aI., supra note 7, § 472 at 936. 
45 Of course, this issue is inapplicable to a case in which 
hearsay is sought to be admitted under 5-804(b )(5) 
where the declarant is unavailable. 
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by unidentified legislators during "heat of political 
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first learned on the eve of trial that its witness would 
disobey a court order and refuse to testify; defendant 
was acutely aware of the proffered evidence and its 
substance prior to trial). 
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Insurer asserted that the fire was set deliberately by the 
plaintiff. To rebut the insurer's allegation, the plaintiff 
offered a letter written by plaintiff s public adjuster, and 
sent to the insurer, stating that it was both the plaintiff s 
and the adjuster's understanding that the insurer had 
told the plaintiff that he was not a suspect in the fire. The 
appellate court held as garbage the letter because it was 
"merely a self-serving statement written by a represen-
tative of the party who [sought] its admission .... "); 
Cookv. Hoppin, 783 F.2d 684,690-91 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(A tenant sued a landlord for negligence after suffering 
injuries from a fall on a stairway. The landlord at-
tempted to introduce statements contained in the 
plaintiff s medical records stating that the plaintiff had 
received injuries in a "shoving or wrestling match" 
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misperception on the part of the postal official. Even 
though it does not easily fit into any of the enumerated 
exceptions ... the postmark's circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness make it a perfect candidate for 
Federal Rule 803(24) .... " The postmark in this case, 
however, was excluded because the proponent failed to 
give advance notice. Otherwise, the postmark would 
have been a glass slipper.). 
90 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961). 
91 The evidence was deemed to be necessary because 
witnesses to the alleged fire, if any were still alive, were 
incapable offully recalling the event. The trustworthi-
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103 E.g., United States v. Balarno, 618 F.2d 624 (10th 
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104 E.g., id See also United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 
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106 See Judd Burstein, Admission of an Unavailable 
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108 Compare Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1,536 A.2d 
666, cert. denied, 312 Md. 602, 541 A.2d 965 (1988) 
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(1988). 
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See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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